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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018

TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
CLOSING VOTKINSK AND POE'S ON START EXPIRATION, JULY 17,
2008

REF: A. STATE 60792 (RNC/STR 08-154/135)

[1](#)B. 01 STATE 37656

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-006.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 3:30 - 4:20 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the Russian Mission on July 17, 2008. Representatives from the U.S., Belarus, Russia and Ukraine were present. Kazakhstan was not represented. The Russian Delegation initiated the first JCIC discussion on procedures that will be required to terminate continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility and the closure of Points of Entry (POE) should START expire in December 2009. The U.S. and Russian Delegations agreed to discuss questions concerning the completion of continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility in a bilateral working group. All Parties present agreed that it will be necessary to further discuss procedures for closing POEs in all countries in the event of START expiration. The second topic raised by the Russian Delegation was that, beginning in January 2008, Russia had implemented the new SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures, which included the elimination of the casing of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM). Russia is still considering how to resolve the question associated with SS-25 SCDM casings that were not included in elimination procedures prior to 2008. The U.S. Delegation said that,

since the casings were not present or eliminated, the U.S. did not consider SS-25 ICBMs presented for elimination prior to 2008 to be completely eliminated in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol.

WHEN START STOPS

14. (S) Koshelev opened the first JCIC discussion on procedures required to complete continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility should START expire in December 2009. Koshelev said the Russian Federation realized that terminating continuous monitoring activities at Votkinsk was a complex process which would take time to plan and that is why the Russian Federation proposed it be put on the JCIC agenda. Koshelev stated that it would be necessary to resolve questions regarding the itemization of assets, as well as funding and legal matters. Moreover, the Russian Federation recommended creating a joint document that may require authorization at the executive level outlining agreed upon procedures for the termination of continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility. Koshelev remarked that experience could be drawn from procedures used to close Russian continuous monitoring activities at the U.S. Missile Production Facility in Magna, Utah in 2001, following the end of the INF inspection regime.

15. (S) Koshelev mentioned that Mr. Faircloth, Director of the On-site Inspection Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, discussed the issue of terminating continuous monitoring activities at Votkinsk with the head of the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) on July 02, 2008. Koshelev noted that Mr. Faircloth informed the Russian NRRC chief of U.S. plans to transfer some U.S. assets and equipment located at the Votkinsk Production Facility to Russia free of charge. Russia did the same in 2001 upon terminating its activities in Magna.

16. (S) Koshelev mentioned that another issue for consideration, in connection with the expiration of START, was the proper closure of POEs and removal of POE associated equipment such as Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE) from the territory of the Russian Federation.

17. (S) Taylor responded with the United States' view that, if the START Treaty expires and there are no follow-on agreements regarding the right to maintain continuous monitoring at Votkinsk, the United States would expect to cease continuous monitoring at Votkinsk and to remove all personnel and related equipment prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The United States would, of course, be open to working with the Russian Federation to reach agreement on suitable means to commemorate the ending of over 20 years of continuous monitoring at Votkinsk.

18. (S) Taylor addressed all Parties present stating that the expiration of the START Treaty would end the use of POE for START purposes, unless a separate agreement were to be reached with respect to the establishment and use of POEs. The United States would expect to remove any equipment currently stored at those POEs and would expect the other Parties to do likewise.

19. (S) Taylor explained to the Parties that the United States was still in the early stages of planning for POE closures and the termination of continuous monitoring activities at Votkinsk, in the event of START expiration and that he had no further information available to relay.

110. (S) All Parties present agreed that, taking into consideration the potential expiration of START, the proper closures of POEs and accountability of equipment is a subject that needs to be discussed in more detail in the future. The U.S. and Russia agreed to move the discussion about the completion of continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility to a bilateral working group.

SHOW ME THE SS-25 SCDM CASINGS

¶11. (S) Koshelev stated that, in January 2008, Russia began implementation of the new SS-25 elimination procedures in accordance with the closing plenary at JCIC-XXXI, which allowed U.S. inspectors the opportunity to inspect SS-25 SCDM casings that were to be eliminated. Koshelev noted that 28 SS-25 ICBMs had been eliminated since January 2008.

¶12. (S) Koshelev remarked that Russian experts were still determining how the question of SS-25 SCDM casings, not considered to be eliminated prior to 2008, would be resolved. He concluded by saying that all Parties would be informed once the Russian Federation had determined how it could proceed when it was ready to resolve this issue.

¶13. (S) Taylor responded by acknowledging the Russian Federation's cooperation in bringing SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures into compliance with the Treaty by exhibiting the "full set of elements" for the SS-25, "including the hull of the instrument compartments." Since January 2008, 28 SS-25 ICBMs, including their entire self-contained dispensing mechanisms, have been eliminated. Taylor remarked that Washington concurred with the removal of these missiles from accountability and concluded by saying that the U.S. looked forward to receiving information on the casings that had not been completely eliminated.

¶14. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Fortier
Maj Gondol
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Tessier
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Mr. Smith
Mr. Brown
Mr. Edinger
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ponamarev

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Kashirin
CAPT(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Mr. Lapshin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Serov
Mr. Smirnoff
Ms. Sorokina
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bodarenko
MGen. Fedetov

Mr. Demidenko

¶16. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text